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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REFORM IN
PENNSYLVANIA
By CLARK BYSE t
Three years ago the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted the
"Administrative Agency Law" and the "Pennsylvania Register Act" to
regulate certain aspects of administrative procedure, judicial review
of administrative adjudications, and publication of administrative
regulations.1 Two years later the Pennsylvania Register Act was
repealed; 2 the Administrative Agency Law was amended; 3 and the
Joint State Government Commission was instructed to study and
report to the next session of the General Assembly concerning "the
problems of making uniform the practice and procedure before ad-
ministrative agencies of the State Government and of appeals there-
from, as well as the review of regulations promulgated by such
agencies; and . . . the problem of publishing all regulations of State
agencies in one register, and making their validity contingent on such
publication . . ." ' The purpose of this paper is to consider some
of the more significant reform proposals which have been or will be
urged upon the Joint State Government Commission in its administra-
tive law study. Because proposals for reform are intelligible only in
light of that which has gone before, discussion of the specific proposals
is preceded by a brief survey of the background and provisions of the
Agency Law and the Register Act.
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY LAW AND PENNSYLVANIA REGISTER
I ACT OF 1945
The origins of Pennsylvania administrative procedure legisla-
tion, like those of its federal counterpart,5 are to be found in the
activities of the organized bar. In 1938 the Pennsylvania Bar Associa-
t B.E., 1935, State Teachers College, Oshkosh, Wisconsin; LL.B., 1938, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin; LL.M., 1939, Columbia University; Professor of Law, University
of Pennsylvania.
I wish at the outset to express my indebtedness to the authors of the articles
appearing in the Synposium on State Administrative Procedure, 33 IOWA L. REv. 193-
375 (1948). The reader desiring additional information and views concerning many
of the topics discussed in this paper will find the symposium a valuable reference.
1. Pa. Laws 1945, Nos. 442 and 443.
2. Pa. Laws 1947, No. 509.
3. Pa. Laws 1947, No. 541.
4. PA. HOUsE RES. No. 40 (1947). The Resolution specifically requested the
Joint State Government Commission to present "recommendations" and "drafts of
proposed legislation."
5. Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237, 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-
1011 (Supp. 1946).
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lion created a Special Committee on Administrative Law to "analyze
the present practices and procedures before the various State adminis-
trative agencies . . . The Committee energetically began its task
of assembling the necessary data, and at the next meeting of the Bar
Association submitted a lengthy report describing the work it had
completed and outlining its future action.7  The report listed the ad-
ministrative orders for which there were no statutory provisions for
direct judicial review, discussed the methods of securing review of
such orders, and tabulated the various statutory provisions govern-
ing judicial review of orders expressly made reviewable by statute.'
The report also stated that subcommittees were at work gathering
information concerning the organization, functions, duties and pro-
cedures of Pennsylvania administrative tribunals and that the Com-
mittee intended to submit a "detailed report" concerning these mat-
ters at the next meeting of the Association.9 But the detailed report
was not forthcoming at the next Association meeting. Possibly the
Committee found that laying bare the actual workings of the ad-
ministrative process is considerably more difficult than compiling data
concerning judicial review.1" Also, by this time the Committee had
decided that its research should be coordinated with that of the Joint
State Government Commission which had recently instituted a study
of Pennsylvania administrative procedure."'
After conducting a series of hearings, the Joint State Govern-
ment Commission submitted a brief report to the General Assembly
recommending enactment of two proposed bills dealing with admmuis-
6. 44 PA. B. A. REP. 134 (1938). At the next meeting of the Association the
Committee was instructed to consider the preparation of remedial legislation. 45 P.A.
B. A. REP. 112 (1939). In 1941 the Association created a permanent Section on
Administrative Law and therefore discharged the Committee. 47 PA. B. A. REP. 27,
37 (1941).
7. 45 PA. B. A. REP. 344-419 (1939).
8. In this, its first report, the Committee observed "... existing law is in a
condition of chaos and confusion which merits the early sponsoring of remedial
measures." 45 PA. B. A. REp. 344, 350 (1939). See also the article by Mr. Gilbert
Nurick, Secretary of the Committee, Much Ado About Something-The Story of
Adninistrative Chaos in Pennsylvania, 45 DIcK. L. REv. 85 (1941).
9. 45 PA. B. A. REP. 344, 418 (1939).
10. See the statement of Mr. Gilbert Nurick, Secretary of the Committee, 45 PA.
B. A. REP. 112 (1939) : ". . . we have started a questionnaire circulating among the
various tribunals, to ascertain their procedure . . .but the response has been prac-
tically negative." The 1940 report of the Committee, however, states: "A subcom-
mittee prepared a questionnaire which was circulated among the agencies. Practically
all of these have been returned." 46 PA. B. A. REP. 248 (1940).
11. Report of Committee on Administrative Law, 46 PA. B. A. REP. 248
(1940). The Joint State Government Commission is a joint legislative commis-
sion of the General Assembly. It is composed of senators and representatives, and
it was established to serve the General Assembly as "a fact-finding body and as an
authoritative source of information." See JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION,
A STATEMENT OF THE HISTORY, PURPOSES, AND AcTIVITIES OF THE JOINT STATE
GOVERNMENT COMMISSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA (1940);
see also PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 46, §§ 65-68 (Purdon, 1941).
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trative procedure, judicial review, and publication of administrative
regulations.' In the meantime, the Section on Administrative Law
of the Pennsylvania Bar Association had also prepared drafts of very
similar bills."3 At the 1943 session of the General Assembly, bills
drafted by the Section on Administrative Law and approved by
the Pennsylvania Bar Association were introduced in the Senate.'4
The bills were passed by the Senate in amended form, but were
not approved by the House of Representatives. At the 1945 ses-
sion of the General Assembly, however, the efforts of the Bar Associa-
tion were finally rewarded by enactment of the Administrative Agency
Law '" and the Pennsylvania Register Act.'6
The Administrative Agency Law provides for publication of ad-
ministrative regulations,' 7 procedure for administrative adjudications,' s
and judicial review of adjudications.' 9 The coverage of the Law is
stated in broad terms to include administrative agencies "having
Statewide jurisdiction, empowered to determine or affect rights, privi-
leges, immunities or obligations . , 20 But Section 51 drastically
limits this coverage by declaring that the sections of the Law govern-
ing procedure for adjudications and judicial review of adjudications
shall not apply to an adjudication from which an appeal to a court is
12. JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ON UNIFORM PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
BEFORE DEPARTMENTS, BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (1943).
13. 48 PA. B. A. REP. 239 (1942). Note that the Special Committee on Ad-
ministrative Law of the Bar Association had been discharged in 1941 upon creation
of the Section on Administrative Law. See note 6 supra.
14. Sen. Bills Nos. 53 and 54, Pa. Gen. Ass., 1947 Sess. See Report of Section
on Administrative Law, 49 PA. B. A. REP. 170 (1943).
15. Pa. Laws 1945, No. 442. The present version of the Agency Law appears in
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-1710.51 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
16. Pa. Laws 1945, No. 443, repealed by Pa. Laws 1947, No. 509.
17. § 21. "Regulation" is defined as "any rule, regulation or order in the nature
of a rule or regulation, generally applicable to the public, promulgated by an agency
authorized by statute so to do, but shall not be construed to include the name or facts
of any adjudication giving rise to such regulation." § 2(e).
18. §§ 31-35. "Adjudication" is defined as "any final order, decree, decision, de-
termination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges,
immunities or obligations of any or all of the parties to the proceeding in which the
adjudication is made, but shall not mean any final order, decree, decision, determina-
tion or ruling based upon a proceeding before a court, or which involves the seizure
or forfeiture of property, or which involves paroles or pardons." § 2(a).
19. §§ 41-45. The Agency Law also contains two sections (11 and 12) providing
for representation of parties before agencies and for the discipline of attorneys prac-
ticing before agencies.
20. "Agency" is defined as "any department, departmental administrative board
or commission, independent administrative board or commission, officer or other agency
of this Commonwealth, now in existence or hereafter created, having Statewide juris-
diction, empowered to determine or affect private rights, privileges, immunities or
obligations by regulation or adjudication, but shall not include a court of record nor
a magistrate, alderman or justice of the peace." § 2(b).
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provided by another statute or which is made final by another statute.'
This point deserves to be underscored: the adjudication and judicial
review provisions of the Administrative Agency Law apply only to
adjudications of agencies operating under statutes which neither
expressly permit nor preclude an appeal from the adjudication. The
coverage of the Law, therefore, is much less extensive than a hasty
reading would indicate, for most of the statutes administered by the
major state agencies, as well as those executed by many of the less
important tribunals, expressly provide for a direct appeal."
As originally enacted, the Administrative Agency Law provided
for publication of regulations pursuant to the terms of the Pennsylvania
Register Act. Briefly stated, the Register Act required publication
of regulations in the "Pennsylvania Register" within forty-five days
after their adoption. With the repeal of the Register Act in 1947,
the Agency Law was amended to provide simply that regulations then
in effect or thereafter adopted "shall have no effect, unless they are
printed and made available, upon written request, within thirty days
after the date of adoption." 24
The procedure prescribed for adjudications subject to the Ad-
ministrative Agency Law requires: reasonable notice and opportunity
for hearing in a proceeding in which the technical rules of evidence
need not be applied and at which all relevant evidence of reasonable
probative value may be received; an opportunity to submit briefs; oral
argument upon substantial issues at the discretion of the agency;
21. This broad exemption was included in the Law only because "it was certain
that the bill would not pass unless this exemption were incorporated." Report of
Section on Administrative Law, 52 PA. B. A. Rap. 179, 181 (1946).
Section 51 provides for other exemptions from some or all of the provisions of
the Law. These relate primarily to proceedings involving taxes, bonuses, and the
seizure and liquidation of banks, building and loan associations, and insurance
companies.
22. See parts II and III of the Report of the Committee on Administrative Law,
45 PA. B. A. REP. 344, 348-374 (1939). See also Faught, The Multiplication of
Administrative Agencies and Problems of Judicial Review in Pennsylvania, 13 TEMP.
L. Q. 30, 32-33 (1938) ; Schulman, Administrative Procedure-A Survey of Suggested
Reforms, 15 TEmp. L. Q. 1, 19-26 (1940).
23. The Register Act provided for the creation of a new publication to be known
as the "Pennsylvania Register" to be published under the supervision of the "Penn-
sylvania Register Board" consisting of the Secretary of Property and Supplies, the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, the Attorney General (or their representatives) and
the Director of the Legislative Reference Bureau as chairman. Regulations in effect
at the effective date of the Act were to be codified and filed with the Director of the
Legislative Reference Bureau within 100 days; future regulations were to be pub-
lished in the Register within 45 days after adoption; regulations not filed or published
within the specified periods would expire. However, a regulation could become
effective without prior publication upon certification by the Department of Justice
that because of an emergency or other compelling extraordinary circumstance the
public interest so required. The first issue of the Register was to be published within
150 days after the effective date of the Register Act and at least monthly thereafter.
Once a year a cumulative index was to be published, bringing all agency regulations
which remained in effect down to date. The effective date of the Act was Jan. 1,
1946. The first volume of 1100 odd nages of regulations is dated June 1, 1946.
24. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71, § 1710.21 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
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findings and reasons for the administrative determination; and service
of the findings, reasons, and final order upon the parties or their
counsel. The Law also authorizes agencies to adopt rules of practice
for adjudication proceedings.
The judicial review sections of the Law enable aggrieved persons
to secure judicial review of the administrative adjudications by taking
an appeal therefrom to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
within thirty days after service of the final order. The procedure for
the appeal is governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant
to Section 42 of the Agency Law." The appellant is not precluded
from questioning the validity of the substantive statute involved, but
he may not raise questions not presented to the agency unless allowed
by the court for good cause. Existing equitable remedies are spe-
cifically preserved. The court may grant a supersedeas upon such
conditions as it shall prescribe. The appeal is to be heard on the ad-
ministrative record. The administrative order is to be affirmed unless
the court shall find that it violates constitutional rights of the appellant,
or is not in accordance with law, or that a necessary finding of fact
is not supported by substantial evidence, or that the adjudication pro-
visions of the Law have been violated. If the administrative order
is not affirmed, the court may set it aside, modify it in whole or in part,
or remand the proceeding to the agency for further disposition in ac-
cordance with the order of the court.
The foregoing resum6 demonstrates the rudimentary character of
the Administrative Agency Law. First, the Section 51 exemption of
adjudications for which an appeal to a court is provided by another
statute renders the Law inapplicable to the adjudicative activities of
most of the more important state agencies. Second, the Law is almost
exclusively concerned with the procedure for, and court review of,
formal administrative adjudications. Topics such as the following,
which have been the subject of legislation in other jurisdictions,2"
are not covered by the Law: procedure to be followed in enacting
regulations or making investigations; judicial review, by declaratory
25. Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Appeals from Certain Administrative
Agencies, effective Feb. 4, 1946. GODRIcH-AmRAm, PENNSYLVANIA PROCEDURAL
RULES SERVICE WITH FORSS, ISSUE '46 (1940).
26. For a discussion of recent legislative developments in the field of state admin-
istrative law which I have found particularly helpful, see Nathanson, Recent Statutory
Developments in State Administrative Law, 33 IowA L. REv. 252 (1948). See also
Hoyt, The Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act [1944] Wis. L. REv. 214; Kleps,
The California Administrative Procedure Act (1947), 22 J. STATE B. OF CALIF. 391
(1947) ; Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. REV. 196
(1948); Tunks, The Model Act Route to Improvement of Iowa Administrative Pro-
cedure, 33 IowA L. REv. 356 (1948) ; Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60
STAT. 237, 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-1011 (1946). The provisions of the Model Act and of
the Federal Act are compared in Abel, The Double Standard in Administrative Pro-
cedure: Model Act and Federal Act, 33 IowA L. REV. 228 (1948).
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judgment or otherwise, of administrative regulations; authorization
of declaratory rulings by administrative agencies; opportunity for in-
formal settlements; and establishment of an office or division of ad-
ministrative procedure to exercise a continuous responsibility of ex-
amination and supervision of administrative procedure in the state.
Third, even those procedures that are governed by the Law are not
regulated in a comprehensive or detailed manner: the provision for
publication of regulations is stated in terms of a rough requirement
of availability upon written request within thirty days after adop-
tion; some of the adjudication requirements are but general provi-
sions declaratory of basic constitutional safeguards; and the adjudica-
tion sections contain no explicit provisions for official notice,
utilization of official records, introduction of written evidence, an
intermediate report or proposed decision, or for separation of the
functions of investigating and prosecuting from the function of
deciding.
It should be emphasized that to enumerate items which either are
not presently covered by the Agency Law or are regulated in general
terms is not to suggest that those matters should be controlled by
statute. On the contrary, the only purpose of the enumeration is to
put the Agency Law in proper perspective before proceeding to a dis-
cussion of the proposals to reform the law.
II. REFORM PROPOSALS
Suggestions for administrative procedure reform in Pennsylvania
range from outright repeal of the Administrative Agency Law to re-
placing it with a statute copied almost verbatim from the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act. Intermediate proposals recommend
retention and amendment of the Law.
A. Proposal to Repeal the Administrative Agency Law
House Bill No. 1210 of the 1947 session of the General Assembly
provided for the outright repeal of the Administrative Agency Law.2 7
I do not know what motivated the sponsor of the bill. But it is inter-
esting to note how plausible an argument can be made in support of
the position that general administrative procedure legislation is neces-
sarily undesirable, and, presumably therefore, if already enacted, should
27. This bill was passed by the House of Representatives by a vote of 189 to 0.
30 PA. LEGIS. J. 1905 (April 24, 1947). It was amended in the Senate to provide for
(1) repeal of the sections of the Agency Law requiring publication of regulations pur-
suant to the Pennsylvania Register Act and (2) making regulations available upon
written request within thirty days after the date of adoption. The House concurred
in the Senate amendments, and in this form it became law. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71,
§ 1710.21 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
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be repealed. The proponent of this view could urge that administrative
agencies exercise extremely diverse functions, ranging from the issu-
ance of a driver's license to the fixing of prices; that these diverse
functions are exercised by administrators of widely varying capacities
and backgrounds, ranging from the part-time lay official to the full
time professional expert; that, in short, the differences are more
pronounced than the likenesses; and that therefore legislation prescrib-
ing uniform administrative procedure will either be couched in such
general terms as to be virtually meaningless as a legislative prescription
or be so concrete as to work hardship in specific cases.2 The argument
finds support in the Report of the director of the most notable study
of state administrative procedure undertaken in this country.29 On
this point, Mr. Benjamin concluded:
"My description of diversity in existing procedure has . .
shown that much of the existing diversity exists for reasons that
are not merely valid but inescapable. Thus a uniform procedure
would be impossible, if it were thought desirable. And this would
be so even if a code were confined to an attempt to provide the
fundamentals of fair procedure, such as adequate specification of
the issues, on which all would agree. A provision that would
be appropriate to secure adequate specification of the issues in an
unfair labor practice case in the State Labor Relations Board, or
in a proceeding for the revocation of a doctor's license, would be
inapplicable to a representation case in the State Labor Relations
Board, or to a driver's license case in the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, or to a benefit claim case in unemployment insurance,
or to a rate case in the Public Service Commission." "
There is much to be said for this point of view, particularly when
the question is whether a detailed code of administrative procedure
should or should not be enacted. If the present issue were one of
adoption or non-adoption of a statute containing the provisions of the
Agency Law, my vote would be cast against adoption, primarily
because the Section 51 exemption and the broad definitions of "agency"
and "adjudication" do not provide for a careful selection of the agencies
and agency activities to which the Law should apply.3 1 But it does
not follow, that the Law should be repealed at this time. It has been
in effect for three years, and there is little or no indication that it has
operated harshly or created undue difficulties. Also, once there has
28. See Cohen, Legislative Injustice and the Supremacy of "Law," 26 NEB. L. REv.
323 (1947).
29. By Robert M. Benjamin of the New York bar. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942), hereinafter reeferred to as "BEN-
JAMIN REPORT."
30. Id. at 35.
31. This point is more fully developed in part II D 5 of this paper, infra pp. 44-45.
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been an intelligent selection of the particular agencies and agency
activities to which the Law should apply, agency compliance with its
requirements-most of which are stated in broad and general terms-
should in some measure assist private interests while not hindering
effective administration. Such defects as exist should be corrected
after careful study. They do not, however, appear sufficiently grave
to warrant repeal of the entire statute.
B. Proposal to Adopt Provisions of Federal Administrative
Procedure Act
Senate Bill No. 261 of the 1947 session of the General Assembly
would have replaced the Administrative Agency Law with a statute
copied almost verbatim from the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act. The Bill was referred to the Committee on State Government,
which did not report it to the Senate. In this, the Committee acted
wisely, for at least two attributes of the Federal Act make it particularly
inapposite as a charter for state administrative procedure legislation.
Adoption of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act in 1946
was preceded by careful investigation of the actual functioning of the
more important federal agencies, extensive hearings before Congres-
sional committees, and significant compromises between the proponents
of diversity and flexibility and those who wished to achieve greater
uniformity. 2 In the process of compromise the two opposing groups
frequently reached formal agreement on particular wording, but each
read the words to mean different things.33 This means that to a con-
siderably greater extent than generally is true of legislative com-
promises, the significance of this legislation must await definitive
interpretation by the Supreme Court. Surely, a state desiring to im-
prove its administrative procedure should not slavishly copy a statute
containing the ambiguities and compromises of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
A second and more basic objection to adopting the federal pro-
visions is that the Administrative Procedure Act was tailored for
the federal administrative establishment. The studies which preceded
its enactment, the testimony submitted to the Congressional commit-
tees, and the compromise proposals embodied in the Act were all
32. See generally Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure
Act, 41 ILL. L. REv. 368 (1946).
33. See Conard, New Ways to Write Laws, 56 YALE L. J. 458, 461, n. 13. See
also Dickinson, Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened Jit-
dicial Review, 33 A. B. A. J. 434, 516: ". . . the new statute . . . broadens . . .
the scope and measure of the review which the Federal Courts are henceforth required
to make of administrative action . . ."; with which compare statement of Attorney
General Clark: "This [section] declares the existing law concerning the scope of
julicial review." SEN. Doc. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1946).
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designed to secure workable procedures for the various federal agencies,
rather than to fashion a model procedure code. If, as Mr. Benjamin
has so convincingly shown, there are basic diversities in the procedures
of a single state, 4 it is hardly likely that a statute constructed expressly
for the federal establishment will provide a satisfactory or workable
pattern for the states. Even the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws which began in 1939 to draft a Uni-
form Administrative Procedure Act for recommendation to the various
states abandoned that endeavor in 1943, because in the field of adminis-
trative procedure uniformity among the states is neither desirable
nor feasible.3 5
There may be specific provisions of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act which Pennsylvania would do well to enact. Whether
there are, and if so, which provisions should be adopted, can only be
determined after a critical investigation of existing administrative
practices and procedures in Pennsylvania. I am reasonably certain,
however, that no amount of study would indicate the desirability of
enacting the almost verbatim copy of the Federal Act embodied in
Senate Bill No. 261. Here, as throughout the entire field, the em-
phasis should be upon selective remedial measures determined after
careful study rather than upon reform proposals based upon general
theories and applying in an overall, and perhaps indiscriminate, fashion
to diverse administrative activities.
C. Proposal to Adopt the Model State Administrative Procedure Act
After abandonment of the project to write a Uniform Adminis-
trative Procedure Act in 1943, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws directed its energies to the production
of a Model State Administrative Procedure Act." As approved by
the 1946 meeting of the Conference, the Model Act consists of 16
sections.37 The Chairman of the Special Committee which drafted the
Act has stated that the Act is intended "to serve as a verbal embodi-
ment of the basic principles of common sense, justice, and fairness that
34. See note 30 supra.
35. HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORMx STATE
LAWS AND PRO EEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONFEENCE 83-86 (1943).
36. Ibid. The distinction drawn by the National Conference between a "Uniform"
and a "Model" Act is as follows: "Where there is a demand for an Act covering the
subject matter in a substantial number of the States, but where in the judgment of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws it is not a subject upon
which uniformity between the States is necessary or desirable, but where it would be
helpful to have legislation which would tend toward uniformity where enacted, Acts on
such subjects are promulgated as Model Acts." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Act
WITH PREFATORY NOTE 8 (1946).
37. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT WITH PREFATORY NOTE (1946).
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should be deemed of universal applicability wherever the affairs of
mankind are subjected to regulation by governmental administrative
processes." " Despite this statement of objective, neither the Chair-
man of the Special Committee nor the Conference presents the Model
Act for "immediate and verbatim adoption in each of the forty-eight
states" but rather put it forward "as an aid to the development of
administrative procedure bills in those states that may be considering
the adoption of such legislation." 39
Certainly, if the sponsor and draftsmen of the Model Act do not
urge its verbatim adoption, their counsel and the warnings of Mr.
Benjamin argue strongly against such action in Pennsylvania. So
far as I know, no legislator or other individual or group proposes
enactment of the Model Act by the Commonwealth. In fact, the only
public expression on the question of which I am aware specifically
rejects the solution of patterning legislation after the Model Act.4"
In view of this action of the Section on Administrative Law of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association and of the position of the sponsor and
draftsmen of the Model Act, it is unlikely that adoption of that Act
will be considered seriously by the Joint State Government Commis-
sion. Additional discussion of the Model Act at this time, therefore,
hardly seems necessary."
D. Proposals to Amend the Administrative Agency Law
The Section on Administrative Law of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association has declared its opinion that future legislative reform of
administrative procedure in the Commonwealth should be based upon
retention of the Administrative Agency Law "and proceeding through
amendments to improve that statute and to extend its coverage..." '
This position of the group which has been the driving force for ad-
ministrative procedure reform, coupled with the action of the 1947
Session of the General Assembly in rejecting the extremes of outright
38. Stason, supra note 26, at 200.
39. Stason, supra note 26, at 208; see also Fuchs, The Model Act's Division of
Administrative Proceedings into Rule-Making and Contested Cases, 33 IowA L. Rav.
210, 213 (1948).
40. Report of Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386 (1948).
41. Readers particularly interested in the Model Act should consult the Sympo-
sium on State Administrative Procedure, 33 IowA L. REv. 193-375 (1948) ; they ought
also examine the experiences of Missouri and Wisconsin which have enacted admin-
istrative procedure statutes largely based upon the provisions of the Model Act. See
Stason, supra note 26, at 209, n. 19; Hoyt, note 26 supra. Attention is also invited to
the 1948 Report of the Committee on Administrative Law of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, concluding that "neither the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act nor any similar general statute would be a desirable addition to New
York State statutory law." 3 REcoRD oF Ass'N. or B. or N. Y. 207 (1948).
42. In arriving at this conclusion, the Section considered and rejected suggestions
that it recommend legislation patterned after either the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act or the Model Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Report of Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386 (1948).
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repeal or replacement of the Agency Law with a Pennsylvania copy
of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, suggest that the Joint
State Government Commission will give more serious consideration
to recommendations to amend the Law than to any of the more drastic
proposals discussed above.
(1) Procedure in Adopting Regulations: " Public Participation and
Deferred Effectiveness
The 1943 Report of the Joint State Government Commission con-
cerning uniform practice and procedure before administrative agencies
of the Commonwealth stated that in only a "few instances" did agencies
give notice and public hearing before adopting administrative regula-
tions.44 Believing this to be a defect, the Commission in its draft
of a proposed Administrative Agency Law provided that an agency
"having authority to promulgate, amend, or repeal regulations may
'do so only after public hearing following reasonable notice as the
agency may deem appropriate" and that adoption, amendment, or
repeal of a regulation would be ineffective "unless published in the
Pennsylvania Register at least ten days before the date on which it
is to become effective." " The Commission's draft also authorized
adoption and immediate effectiveness of a regulation in cases where
the Governor certified that because of an emergency or other com-
pelling extraordinary circumstances, the public interest required that
the regulation should become effective without delay.46 These recom-
mendations of the Commission were not accepted by the General
Assembly: the Administrative Agency Law as enacted contained no
provision for notice and hearing in making regulations and only re-
quired publication within forty-five days after adoption of the regu-
lation.47 In view of the Commission's stand in 1943 and of the fact
that the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Model Act
contain provisions concerning these topics, it may be anticipated that
the Commission will give serious consideration to recommending
43. The definition of regulation contained in the Administrative Agency Law is
set forth note 17 supra. The Section on Administrative Law of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association would amend that definition to read as follows: "'Regulation' means any
rule, regulation or order of general application and future effect promulgated by an
agency under statutory authority prescribing the practice or procedure before such
agency or interpreting or implementing any statute enforced or administered by such
agency." See Report of Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386, 387;
Sen. Bill No. 95, Pa. Gen. Ass. 1947 Sess. For an excellent analysis of the prob-
lem of defining regulation, see Davis, Administrative Rides-Interpretative, Legis-
lative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L. J. 919, 919-924 (1948).
44. JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 12, at 1.
45. Id. at 16, 17.
46. Id. at 17.
47. The "regulation procedure" of the original Administrative Agency Law is set
forth in §§ 21-23 of Pa. Laws 1945, No. 442.
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legislative action in this field. Should it do so, it is my opinion that
it should not adhere to its 1943 position.
The primary objective to be achieved by public participation in
the process of making administrative regulations is to assure fair
and informed administrative action by enabling the affected interests
to present facts within their knowledge and their views concerning the
merits and defects of the proposed action." A second objective of
public participation is to give the regulated groups a feeling of sharing
in the regulatory task, to satisfy them that their interests have been
fairly and adequately considered, and thereby to secure their coopera-
tion in administration of the regulations.49
A public hearing may be the most appropriate means for accom-
plishing these objectives. But before concluding that it is, attention
must be given to other techniques for achieving the same goals. These
include conferences, interviews, questionnaires, submission of proposed
regulations for comment, collaboration in drafting regulations, recep-
tion of documentary evidence and written arguments, and utilization
of advisory boards and committees. 50 The choice of procedure-public
hearing or one or more of the substitute devices just mentioned-will
depend upon a variety of factors. In some instances the proposed regu-
lation may impinge so directly upon important economic interests and
involve such controversial and basic policy problems that a public
hearing would constitute the best medium for airing views and rec-
onciling differences. But in other situations, the regulation may be
so simple and uncontroversial that a public hearing would be com-
pletely wasteful, productive only of delay and expense. Or at the
other extreme, the subject matter may be so technical and complex
that a public hearing would "contribute little to the administrative
understanding, in comparison with the rich cargo of information and
opinion . . ." to be secured from personal consultation and written
comments.5' An emergency may require immediate issuance of the
48. See Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity to Be Heard in the Administra-
tive Process, 51 YALE L. J. 1093 (1942).
49. See BENJAMIN REPORT, 297.
50. These devices for securing public participation in the administrative process
are more fully discussed in BENJAMIN REPoRT 297-312; GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADmIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 123-144 (1941); REP. ATr'y GEN. Comm. AD. PRoC. 103-105;
Davis, note 48 supra; Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv.
L. REv. 259 (1938); Memorandum on Administrative Procedure Bills by Dean G.
Acheson, Hearings before Subcommittee on the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675, and S.
918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 827-829 (1941).
51. See A-r'y. GEN. Comm!. AD. PROC., Sen. Doc. No. 186, Part 10, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 32-33 (1940). And consider the following observation by Mr. Alfred Jaretzki,
JR.: "My own experience . . . is that personal conferences are the most efficient
way of making your ideas felt. I think that many lose sight of the fact that the rea-
son for the establishment of many administrative agencies is that the business of the
Government has become so complex that there has had to be established, in effect,
business bodies to deal with matters in business ways. The old town-hall meeting
type of procedure is not appropriate for a great many matters that must be handled
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regulation. In other instances, even where there is no emergency
the character of the rule may be such that it must be issued without
first referring it to the public. The agency may have already ac-
cumulated in its files the necessary information and expression of
views. Or advisory groups (broadly representative of the opposing
interests in the regulated industry) which continuously cooperate with
the agency may prove the most satisfactory means for securing public
participation by the affected interests.
Since these, and probably other," factors should be taken into
account in determining the appropriate procedure to be followed in
making regulations, it seems clear that a blanket requirement of notice
and public hearing is inadvisable. Still, the unquestioned desirability
of participation by affected interests, and the failure of many Penn-
sylvania agencies "to give any notice whatsoever" " suggests the
propriety of a legislative effort to encourage public participation.
Much could be accomplished by enactment of a simple provision:
"Each agency shall, to the extent and in the manner it deems desirable,
afford interested persons opportunity to participate in the process of
making, amending, or repealing regulations." The italicized portion
of the provision would make it essentially hortatory. But the variety-
even diversity-of factors to be considered and the importance of
retaining for the administrative a flexible area in which it may experi-
mentally develop improved administrative procedures argue convinc-
ingly against a more rigid requirement. Of course, adoption of such
a general guide for all agencies should not preclude more specific
and binding requirements for particular agencies or particular types
of administrative functions in any instance in which careful investiga-
tion discloses the need for more restrictive and detailed provisions.
The advantage of deferring the effectiveness of administrative
regulations is that the period of deferment gives the affected persons
time to adjust themselves to the new requirements. Moreover, it may
happen that despite careful pre-issuance procedure an important factor
has been overlooked. If there is a period of deferred effectiveness, the
affected persons will be able to bring the oversight to the attention
of the agency, and the agency will be able to correct the error, before
expeditiously. Furthermore, in my experience the average businessman prefers to sit
across the table and discuss possible rules and regulations with an agency rather than
to appear at public hearings." Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1296 (1941).
52. E. g., there would appear to be little need for a public hearing where the
agency promulgating the regulations is composed of members representative of the
affected interests. See Davis, supra note 48, at 1099.
53. "While in a few instances, administrative agencies in Pennsylvania give public
notice of one form or another as to the intended promulgation or adoption of new
rules and regulations, most of these agencies adopt them without any notice whatsoever
to the persons who may be affected by them." JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT Co MMlS-
sloN, op. cit. sipra note 12, at 1.
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rather than after, the regulation becomes effective.54 On the other
hand, if the interested persons have been fully informed by pre-issuance
procedures, or if the regulation, instead of establishing new require-
ments, relieves persons from requirements imposed by statute or other
rules, or, most important, if the public interest demands that the regu-
lation become effective immediately, a fixed requirement of deferred
effectiveness becomes unnecessary or undesirable. The 1943 draft
of the Joint State Government Commission met this obstacle by pro-
viding that the provision for deferred effectiveness could be suspended
"in cases in which the Governor shall certify that because of an
emergency or other compelling extraordinary circumstances, the public
interest requires that the regulation become effective without the delay
required for . . . the prior publication of the regulation." 11 But
such a provision "is, in a sense illusory, since one could hardly expect
the governor to do anything but follow the advice of the particular
agency with respect to the need for immediate effectiveness of the
regulation." 56 Here again, it seems clear that reliance must be placed
on the good faith and discretion of the agency. Accordingly, if this
matter is to be the subject of a recommendation by the Joint State
Government Commission, I should suggest the desirability of an es-
sentially hortatory provision expressing the policy of deferred effective-
ness, but giving the agency complete discretion as to both the need for
any postponement of effectiveness and the length of the period of
postponement.
(2) Publication of Regulations
Accepting the scarcely debatable proposition that administrative
regulations having the effect of law should be brought to the attention
of the affected citizen, the problem becomes one of deciding upon ap-
propriate means for achieving the desideratum. The chaos in the
federal field was strikingly exposed in the case of Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan in which Chief Justice Hughes noted that "the persons affected,
the prosecuting authorities, and the courts were alike ignorant" of the
fact that the administrative regulation in question had been repealed
by an executive order.57  Shortly after this decision, Congress passed
54. See testimony of Mr. Dean G. Acheson, Hearings before Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675 and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 813-
814 (1941); REP. AT-r'Y. GEN. Comm!. AD PROC. 114 (1941).
55. JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMmISSIOiN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 17.
56. Nathanson, supra note 26 at 258
57. 293 U. S. 388, 412 (19355 ; see SWISHER, SELECTED PAPERS OF HOmER Cum-
MINGS 123-124 (1939). Only a few months before the Solicitor General had moved
to dismiss the Government's appeal in a case in which an indictment had been brought
and the appeal taken to the Supreme Court in ignorance of the fact that the regulation
in question was nonexistent. United States v. Smith et al., 293 U. S. 633 (1934) ;
See Griswold, Governnwnt in Ignwrance of the Law--A Plea for Better Publication
of Executive Legislation, 48 HARv. L. REv. 198, 204 (1934).
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the Federal Register Act to provide for publication in the Federal
Register of all documents of "general applicability and legal effect." "
Two years later the Act was amended to provide for the publication of
a codification of administrative regulations and related documents. 9
Federal administrative regulations thus appear first in the Federal
Register, which is published five days a week, and then in codified form
in the annual Supplement to the Code of Federal Regulations.6 °
The Pennsylvania Register Act, which was patterned after the
Federal Register Act, represented substantial progress in this field in
the state.6 1 But, for reasons which are somewhat obscure, the General
Assembly repealed the Pennsylvania Act in 1947.62 There is con-
siderable virtue in legislation which, like the federal and Pennsylvania
register acts, requires codification and publication of existing and
future regulations: it enables the interested citizen and his attorney
to ascertain what rules are in effect at any particular time, and it has
the salutary effect of forcing the agencies, in the process of codifying
existing regulations, to re-examine and reappraise the regulations.
On the other hand, publication of a register may be expensive. Also,
as an informed observer has noted, "As now edited the Federal
Register and Code of Federal Regulations are cumbersome and hardly
adequate to meet the real needs of citizens and lawyers. Regulations
are sometimes omitted; the indices are of limited value; the supple-
ments to the Code have been distributed tardily; and amendments and
revisions of regulations have often destroyed the utility of the whole
system, as applied to particular subject matters." 63
Perhaps then it may not be advisable to resurrect the Register,
6 4
but instead to adopt the suggestion which has been made to the Joint
State Government Commission that agencies be required to file their
regulations with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.6 5 My conclu-
58. 49 STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. (1940).
59. 50 STAT. 304 (1937), 44 U. S. C. § 311 (1940).
60. See Wigmore, The Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations-How
to Use Then, If You Have Them, 29 A. B. A. J. 10 (1943).
61. See note 23 supra for a summary of the provisions of the Pennsylvania Act.
62. Pa. Laws 1947, No. 509. The explanation for the repeal given by the Section
on Administrative Law is as follows: "Much opposition developed among state agencies
against the publication of rules and regulations in the Register and this, together with
the physical impossibility of expediting the printing of the second volume of the
Register, brought into being House Bill 1211." 53 PA. B. A. REP. 145 (1947).
63. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 137 (2d ed. 1947).
See also Kleps, What Safeguards Should the California Legislature Provide for Ad-
ninistrative Rule-Making?, 22 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 201 (1947) and CALIFORNIA
DIvisIoN OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT 13-17 (1947) for
an account of the difficulties experienced by California in its endeavor to publicize
administrative regulations.
64. The Section on Administrative Law of the Pennsylvania Bar Association has
recommended re-establishment of the Register. See the Section's 1948 report. 19
PA. B. A. Q. 386, 388 (1948).
65. See Phillips, The Attorney General Looks at Administrative Law in Penn-
sylvania, The Legal Intelligencer, July 6, 1947, p. 1, col. 4.
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sion on this problem is that the Joint State Government Commission
must ascertain the facts and be guided accordingly. If in fact the
majority of the state agencies now are adequately publicizing their
regulations, it would be unwise and unnecessary to impose the ad-
ditional and costly burden of publication. 6 But if the facts demon-
strate inadequate publication procedures, revival of the Register to
correct the inadequacy is in order.6"
(3) Judicial and Legislative Review of Regulations
The Section on Administrative Law of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association has consistently favored enactment of a statute authorizing
judicial review of administrative regulations in a declaratory judgment
proceeding; 68 and the Joint State Government Commission in its
1943 Report to the General Assembly urged that the Commission be
authorized to "nullify any [administrative] rule or regulation, in whole
or in part if, in its opinion, the rule or regulation is contrary to an Act
of the Assembly." 69 It is quite apparent, therefore, that the problem
of judicial, and probably also, legislative, review of administrative
regulations will be considered by the Commission in its present
deliberations.
The argument in favor of judicial review of administrative regula-
tions by use of the declaratory judgment procedure runs somewhat as
follows. An administrative agency promulgates a regulation which
an "aggrieved" person (P) believes is unconstitutional, or is not with-
in the agency's statutory authorization, or was adopted without ob-
servance of the procedure prescribed by statute, or is arbitrary or
capricious. 0 P is thereby put in a singularly embarrassing and un-
66. "I have heard a great deal of criticism of the practice of State agencies of
not publishing regulations, but actually have had no personal experience with any
harm arising from such failure during my term with the present Attorney General."
Phillips, note 65 supra.
67. See Stone, Filing and Publication of Administrative Regulations, Publication
No. 120, Kansas Legislative Council (1943); Kleps, supra note 63; Moreland, State
Administrative Rides and Regidations, 21 Mici. S. B. J. 22 (1942) ; Moreland, State
Administrative Rules, 7 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 171 (1948).
68. See § 305 of the Section's 1942 draft of the Administrative Agency Law,
48 PA. B. A. REP. 243 (1942); § 22 of Sen. Bill No. 95, Pa. Gen. Ass. 1947 Sess.;
Report of Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386, 387 (1948). Section
22 of Sen. Bill No. 95, sponsored by the Bar Association, see 52 PA. B. A. REP. 144
(1947), provides as follows:
"Any person aggrieved by a regulation other than a rate-making, wage-fixing,
or price-fixing regulation shall have the right to petition the Court of Common Pleas
of Dauphin County for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of such regu-
lation or the legality of its application to such person or the particular situation pre-
sented. . . . Said court shall render a declaratory judgment without requiring prior
resort to the agency by the person or persons filing the petition ...
"No regulation shall be declared invalid unless such regulation violates the Con-
stitution of this Commonwealth, or of the United States, or does not come within the
statutory authorization of the agency, or was issued without observance of the pro-
cedure required by the applicable statute, or is arbitrary or capricious. ...
69. Joint State Government Commission, op. cit. supra note 12, at 5, 7, 17.
70. See second paragraph of the proposed statute, supra note 68.
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wholesome position: to fail to obey the regulation may subject him to
administrative or criminal penalties; while to comply with the regula-
tion would be to acquiesce in administrative action which, it is as-
sumed, he honestly believes is invalid. What then should be done?
The answer, of course, has been anticipated: P should institute a
declaratory judgment proceeding in which the court will determine
the validity of the regulation. If the regulation is invalid, clearly P
need not obey; if it is valid, P, of course, will conform. Surely, this
reasonable procedure, "this speedy and inexpensive means of settling
such disputes", 71 should be specifically authorized by enactment of the
proposed statute.72  Further, as was said of an analogous federal
proposal sponsored by the American Bar Association, since injunctive
relief against future administrative action may be obtained where the
individual interest is clear and immediate, why should not the same
relief be secured through the simple and direct declaratory judgment
procedure ? 71
So runs the argument. And an appealing argument it is. Cer-
tainly, no one can doubt that cases will continue to arise in which the
threat of administrative action will be so grave and the individual
interest so clear and immediate that relief should be granted as quickly
as possible. But it does not follow that the proposed statute should
be adopted. The courts of Pennsylvania like those of other states
have found the injunction a convenient and effective means for nullify-
ing invalid administrative regulations.7 4  True, an injunction will not
71. Report of Committee on Administrative Law, 45 PA. B. A. REl. 344, 406
(1939). For additional comments favoring the declaratory judgment as a procedure
for testing administrative regulations, see BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS C.
XIV (2d ed. 1941) ; Declaratory Judgments in. Administrative Law, 11 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rlv. 139 (1933) ; Chiallenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L. J.
445 (1943); Stason, supra noie 26, at 204; Note, Declaratory Judgments and Ad-
ministrative Agewies, 15 TEMP. L. Q. 139 (1940).
72. It is not entirely clear why the general declaratory judgment statute, PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 831 et seq. (Purdon, 1931), could not be utilized for this
purpose. See Jaffe, The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure, 8 U. oF C i. L. REv. 401, 438 (1931) : "I think that the most hope-
ful attack on this problem is not more legislation, but an effort to educate the courts
in a sensible use of the Declaratory Judgment Act." See also testimony of Mr. Alfred
Jaretzki, Jr., Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Judiciary on S. 674,
S. 675, amd S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1300 (1941) : "I feel if declaratory judg-
ments . . . are restricted merely to cases of actual controversy, I am not sure that
you have added anything to the declaratory judgment act. If the act goes beyond
that, I think it is a mistake."
It is possible, of course, that because the Pennsylvania declaratory judgment
statute has at times been given a somewhat restricted interpretation, the sponsors of
the proposed legislation desire merely to avoid all question as to the propriety of using
the regular declaratory judgment procedure for this purpose. The danger, of course,
is, as developed in the text, that the new statute might be interpreted to permit courts
to pass upon abstract controversies without the necessary factual background.
73. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 A. B. A. REP.
331, 335 (1938).
74. Martin v. Baldy, 249 Pa. 253, 94 Atl. 1091 (1915). See also Bell Telephone
Co. of Pennsylvania v. Driscoll et al., 343 Pa. 109, 112, 21 A. 2d 912, 914 (1941) :
"We have no doubt about the right of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin
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be granted unless the requirements for equitable jurisdiction have been
satisfied. 75  It is precisely at this point that I am troubled with the
implications of the proposed statute. If it does no more than confirm
the power of the courts to invalidate administrative regulations in the
type of situation where injunctive relief is appropriate, the statute is
unnecessary. If, as is more likely, the statute would expand the power
of the courts and permit them to pass upon abstract controversies
without the necessary factual background and without exhaustion of
available administrative remedies,78 it is unwise; and its adoption, by
relaxing the principles which should govern the relationships between
the administrative and the judiciary, might endanger the continued de-
velopment of a sound system of administrative justice.
77
No one can say with certainty how the proposed statute would be
interpreted were it enacted. Possibly, the fears expressed would prove
groundless. But since the Pennsylvania courts have not been reluctant
to use the injunction in appropriate instances and since the proposed
statute might reasonably be interpreted to authorize the courts to pass
upon basically hypothetical situations in which the primary purpose
would be to harass the administrative rather than to relieve the in-
dividual from an imminent threat, the balance is against adopting the
proposed statute. If, however, careful investigation should reveal
instances where injunctive or other procedures now available do not
provide adequate relief to private interests, that need should be met
by a more precisely drafted statute. Here, as elsewhere, overall reform
proposals based upon general theories must give way to selective
measures designed to remedy demonstrated defects.
The 1943 proposal of the Joint State Government Commission
that it should be empowered to nullify any administrative regulations
which in its opinion are "contrary to an Act of the Assembly" has
little to commend it. 8 There is no evidence that the Joint State Gov-
ernment Commission, or any other group of legislators in Penn-
County in the exercise of its equitable powers to entertain a bill to enjoin an adminis-
trative agency of the commonwealth from exercising powers not conferred on it or
unconstitutionally conferred on it. That point has been decided too frequently to be
longer in doubt [citing cases]."
75. See Jaretzki, Tlw Administrative Law Bill: Unsound and Unworkable, 2 LA.
L. RFv. 294, 310 (1940), discussing an analogous federal proposal: ". . . it must be
remembered that the courts will only entertain proceedings for injunctions of this
character where the jeopardy to the petitioner is clear and immediate and where, in
consequence, a substantial controversy involving a definite state of facts is presented."
See also Hollearn et al. v. Silverman et al., 338 Pa. 346, 350, 12 A. 2d 292, 293 (1940).
76. Note that the proposed statute, supra note 68, specifically provides, "Said
court shall render a declaratory judgment without requiring prior resort to the agency
by the person or persons filing the petition." See generally, Berger, Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L. J. 981 (1939).
77. See Comment, 42 COL. L. REV. 852, 857 (1942).
78. See note 69 supra; and see the discussion of a somewhat similar Indiana
proposal in Legis., Administrative Lawe--Legislative Control of Administrative Rules,
41 CoL. L. REv. 946 (1941).
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sylvania or elsewhere, has particular competence to appraise the
legality of the diverse and technical regulations of the various state
agencies; and its personnel is subject to change with the shifting tides
of political fortune. 9 Also, the determination of legality is not an
arithmetical process, and the statute makes no provision for securing
the data necessary for an informed judgment.8" Further, it is ques-
tionable whether the members of the Commission would have the time
or the inclination to discharge the routine, onerous task of carefully
examining the myriad regulations issued by the agencies."' And if
the Commission were to delegate the examination assignment to its
staff, it is extremely doubtful whether the benefits to be derived from
the Commission's staff checking on the work of the agency's staff,
which would have previously passed on the legality of the regulation,
are worth the additional expense that would be involved.
There may be instances where, because of the importance of the
subject matter,"2 or the tnavoidable vagueness of the legislative
standard governing the agency's discretion,88 or for other reasons, S4 it
will be desirable to provide for a legislative sharing of the responsibility
for administrative regulations. Again, however, the wise course is not
one of imposing blanket requirements but of carefully selecting the
situations demanding particular treatment.8
(4) Judicial Review of Adjudications: The Substantial Evidence
Problem
Section 44 of the Administrative Agency Law authorizes the re-
viewing court to reverse an adjudication if "any finding of fact made
79. See Hyneman, Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel, 195 ANNALS
21 (1938).
80. The Commission's proposed statute required only a "conference with the
agency" before nullifying regulations. JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, op.
cit. supra. note 12, at 17.
81. Gellhorn, op. cit. supra note 63, at 155. REP. ATr'y. GEN. COMr. AD. PROC.
120 (1941) : "Experience, both in England and in this country, indicates that lack of
desire, rather than lack of opportunity, has accounted for the absence of legislative
interference with administrative regulations."
82. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 76 (1938): "Frequently the adminis-
trative is faced with the need to exercise power that lies within the limits of its
statutory grant; but the subject matter happens to be of such great public concern that
it is desirable to have the more democratic processes of our government participate
in the decision."
83. Isenbergh, Developments in Administrative Law, 27 VA. L. REV. 29, 33-35
(1929).
84. E. g., where the legislature has good reason to believe that the agency or
agencies in question customarily act in excess of their delegated powers. See VIRGINIA
ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, THEIR CREA-
TION, JURISDICTION AND POWERS 5 (1943) : ". . . agencies which are manned, not by
state employees, but by members of the vocation and occupation which they purport
to regulate, are, for the most part, using the Rule-Making power far in excess of that
which could have been reasonably contemplated by the General Assembly . . ."
85. Or, as proposed by Landis, of giving the administrative discretion to request
legislative approval when in its judgment the regulation is so important that the
imprimatur of the Assembly should be secured. Landis, op. cit. supra note 82, at 79.
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by the agency and necessary to support its adjudication is not sup-
ported by substantial evidence." "' The Section on Administrative
Law of the Pennsylvania Bar Association in its 1948 Report recom-
mended amendment of the Agency Law to, "Broaden the power of
the reviewing court so as to permit reversal of adjudications if not
supported by substantial evidence 'in view of the entire record . .. '" Sr
The Report of the Section on Administrative Law does not de-
velop the reasons why the Section desires to "broaden" the reviewing
court's power over administrative fact determinations beyond that
already provided for in the substantial evidence rule, which is now
part of the Agency Law.8" It is very possible, however, that the
Section's proposal to direct the reviewing court to examine the "entire
record" is based upon a fear that the courts of Pennsylvania will so
narrowly interpret the substantial evidence provision of the Agency
Law as to restrict unduly the court's authority to examine the evi-
dential basis of administrative fact determinations-as, for example,
if the courts should decide that the requirement of substantial evidence
merely calls for an examination of the record to find some relevant
evidence to support the determination, disregarding all contrary evi-
dence of the opposing party. It is true that some scholars apparently
read a few decisions of the United States Supreme Court as holding
that substantiality may be determined by looking at the evidence of
only one side without regard for the evidence of the opposing party. 9
86. The judicial review provisions of the Agency Law are summarized supra,
p. 26.
87. Report of the Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386, 387
(1948). See also J 44 of Sen. Bill No. 95, Pa. Gen. Ass., 1947 Sess. The proposals
of the Section also would permit reversal if the adjudication is "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law." Since the present
law already includes a provision for reversal if the adjudication "is not in accordance
with law," I can see little reason for adding the "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion" clause. Surely, an adjudication which is "arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion," is not "in accordance with law"; enactment of this phase of the
proposal, therefore, might well be construed by the courts as an open invitation to
expand the scope of judicial review.
88. See the 1948 Report supra note 87. See also the 1943 Report of Section on
Administrative Law, 49 PA. B. A. REP. 170, 171 (1943), stating that the Section had
considered and rejected the suggestion that § 44 of the proposed Agency Law should
include the italicized clause in the proposal that the court could reverse or remand the
adjudication if "any finding of fact made by the agency and necessary to support its
adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole
record . .
89. See Stason, "Substantial Evuidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 1026, 1039 (1941) ; Dickinson, The Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act (Section 10) Background and Effect, 7 N. Y. U.
SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 546, 588, n. 60 (1947) ; Administrative Law
Symposium, II, 27 A. B. A. J. 207, 209-210 (1941) (comment by Arthur T. Vander-
bilt). See also the testimony of Dean Stason in Hearings before Subcommittee of
the Coinmittee on the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
1355-1356 (1941) and Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H. R. 2390, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1946). The cases
primarily relied upon are NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206
(1940) and NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n., 310 U. S. 318 (1940).
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The opinions in the cases contain some language supporting the posi-
tion that they do sanction such a view. Yet, as Professor Jaffe has
noted, "the opinions themselves rehearse a great mass of evi-
dence, much of it from the employers' witnesses, which seems clearly
to raise issues capable of being decided either way. It is much too
artificial, furthermore, to look upon these cases as involving a pure
exercise in 'rationality'. The cases represent the disposition of the
Supreme Court to give the Labor Board large leeway in deciding what
conduct is wrongful. In other words, the question of the validity of
the Court's performance is probably to be argued as much on the sub-
stantive as on the procedural level :" " And Professor Scanlan argues
that the cases relied upon "as horrible examples of the Supreme Court's
sanctioning of administrative decisions based on a modicum of evi-
dence, do not appear in that light at all, as any dispassionate reading of
the record will confirm." "'
The cases relied upon, then, if they hold as represented, which is
at least debatable, represent an aberration and not a generally accepted
interpretation of the substantial evidence rule. More important for
our purposes, the decisions were made by the United States Supreme
Court, not by Pennsylvania courts; and the Pennsylvania courts have
not given their approval to the one-sided approach which the federal
decisions are said to sanction. 2  There does not seem to me to be a
reasonable possibility that the courts of the Commonwealth would
adopt the one-sided approach, particularly in respect to the agencies
whose adjudications are governed by the Administrative Agency
Law."3 On the contrary, it may be anticipated that when the issue
is appropriately presented, briefed and argued, the appellate courts of
the Commonwealth will hold, as has the New York Court of Appeals,
that the substantiality of the evidence is to be judged on "the record
considered as a whole." " Certainly, if, as has been stated by the
90. Jaffe, Administrative Procedure Re-Examined: The Benjamin Report, 56
HA.v. L. REv. 704, 732 (1943).
91. Scanlan, Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure Act-In Which
Judicial Offspring Receive a Congressional Confirination, 23 No=E DAME LAW. 501,
537 (1948).
92. So far as I have been able to ascertain, neither the Waterman nor the Brad-
ford case, supra note 89, has been cited by either the Supreme Court or the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania. See also Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Kaufman
Department Stores, Inc., 345 Pa. 398, 29 A. 2d 90 (1942) ; Cole et al. v. Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission, 146 Pa. Super. 257, 22 A. 2d 121 (1941).
93. Speaking generally, I should expect that most of the inarticulate factors
which influence the scope of judicial review (see REP. Ar'y GEN. Comm. AD. PROC.
91 (1941)), would tend to produce a broader review of the orders of the conglomerate
group of agencies subject to the Agency Law than of the orders of many of the
agencies exempted from that Law.
94. Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 275, 26 N. E. 2d
247. 256 (1940) ; see also, Matter of Miller v. Kling, 291 N. Y. 65, 50 N. E. 2d 546
(1943) : BENJAMiN REPoRT 328-340 (1942) ; Hoyt, Judicial Review of Administrative
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, orders of administrative boards
"must be supported by evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable mind
to a fair degree of certainty. . . , the entire evidence must be
examined to determine reasonableness.
If the proposal of the Section on Administrative Law is designed
merely to insure judicial examination of the entire record when deter-
mining substantiality, there cannot be the slightest objection to its
purpose. And if assurances could be given that this would be the sole
consequence of adopting the proposal, there should be no opposition to
its enactment by the Assembly. But, if, as I believe, the unqualified
substantial evidence rule, which already is a part of the Agency Law,
provides for review of the entire record, the embarrassing question
presented is: What interpretation would the Pennsylvania courts give
to the additional statutory language? They might, of course, hold
that the language was merely a clarifying restatement of existing law.
It is equally possible, however, they would feel that the Assembly had
given them a new freedom to reverse administrative findings of fact. 6
For my part, I can see no reason for running the risk that the latter
interpretation will be adopted. It is concluded with respect to this
reform proposal, therefore, that until the sponsors of the proposal
can point with definiteness to an inclination on the part of the Penn-
Determination in the States, in Brochure on Administrative Law, A. B. A. Section on
Administrative Law 21, 32-33 (1943); and 7 N. Y. U. SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS, Yupra note 89, at 591, where Mr. Benjamin explained that at the argu-
ment in the Court of Appeals in the Stork Restaurant Co. case, counsel for the
administrative agency argued first, and after he had been arguing for twenty minutes
or so, Judge Lehman said, "Mr. Seward, you have recounted to us evidence in support
of the Board's finding that appears to be substantial. I suggest that you now permit
the respondent to argue, because the question for the court is whether, against the
background of the respondent's evidence, your evidence remains substantial."-thus
showing beyond doubt that consideration must be given to the evidence of both sides.
95. Mr. Justice Stern in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Kaufman De-
partment Stores, Inc., 345 Pa. 398, 400, 29 A. 2d 90, 92 (1942), involving the Penn-
sylvania Labor Relations Act, § 9 of which provides ". . . The findings of the board
as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 43, § 211.9 (Purdon, 1941). See also Cole et al. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, 146 Pa. Super. 257, 22 A. 2d 121 (1941) in which Judge Rhodes cited
Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1026
(1941), note 89 supra. There is no suggestion in Judge Rhodes' reference to Dean
Stason's article that either he or the court was approving or adopting its thesis that
under the "substantial evidence rule . . . the courts should survey the entire record.
." Id. at 1051. But it may be of significance that the Superior Court has seen fit
to invite attention to the Stason article.
96. See, for example, the statement by Phillips, supra note 65, at col. 5: "I think
the suggestion . . . would reduce the agency to the status of an examiner or master
appointed to take testimony." And see Dickinson, Judicial Review of Adiniistrative
Determinations, a Summary and Evaluation, 25 MINN. L. Rav. 588, 596-597, 607-608
(1941), Dickinson, The Acheson Report: A Novel Approach to Administrative Law,
90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 757, 777-778, suggesting that the requirement that findings be
supported by substantial evidence "on the whole record" is, with respect to ordinary
fact questions, equivalent to the rule articulated in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1935), in regard to "constitutional facts."
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sylvania courts to abnegate their responsibility to study the entire
record, the proposal should not be given favorable consideration.1
7
(5) Extension of Coverage of the Administrative Agency Law
As explained at the outset, although the coverage of the Agency
law is stated in broad terms, the Section 51 exemption drastically
limits its scope." Accordingly, it is not surprising to learn that a
recommendation has been made that in its current deliberations the
Joint State Government Commission should "investigate the feasibility
and desirability of extending the coverage of the Administrative Law
which is now highly restricted. . . [and] should exclude only those
agencies which can establish a sound and compelling reason for
exemption." "
The recommendation for an investigation designed to secure the
facts which would permit an informed judgment concerning coverage
certainly should be encouraged. For there may well be agencies
whose adjudications, although now exempt, should be governed by
the provisions of the Agency Law. But the recommendation does
not go far enough. The definitions of "adjudication" '  and
"agency" "' are so comprehensive that some administrative actions
which should not be governed by the Law probably are brought within
its broad sweep. This problem, also, should be investigated by the
Commission or other appropriate agency.
Ideally, the investigation to secure the needed information should
be a part of a much broader study of the entire administrative structure
of the Commonwealth. Such a study would do for Pennsylvania what
the Attorney General's Committee and Mr. Benjamin have done for
federal and New York administration." 2 Without doubt, an investiga-
tion on the plane of those two studies would be expensive and time-
97. Pennsylvania State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v. Schireson,
61 A. 2d 343 (Pa. 1948), the first appellate case involving § 44 of the Agency Law,
decided after this article was in galley, reversed an order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Dauphin County which had affirmed the Board's adjudication revoking Dr.
Schireson's license. Justice Drew wrote the majority opinion holding that the Board's
finding was not supported by substantial evidence. Since the briefs in the case did
not discuss the precise point of whether "substantial evidence" means "substantial evi-
dence in view of the entire record," it is not surprising that the opinion does not ex-
pressly resolve the difficulty discussed in the text. However, Justice Drew did state,
"We have most carefully examined the entire record and have concluded that the weak
and inconclusive evidence adduced by appellee does not rebut the presumption of inno-
cence and that the alleged fraud has not been proved." 61 A. 2d at 347. In my judg-
ment, the majority opinion clearly reflects a determination of substantiality of the evi-
dence in light of the entire record. Justice Linn, with whom Justices Stern and Stearne
concurred, dissented in a brief opinion, contending that there was substantial evidence
to support the Board's findings and that, "It is not the duty of this court to reweigh
the evidence and sit as a super-administrative board." 61 A. 2d at 348.
98. See p. 25 supra.
99. Report of Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386, 388 (1948).
100. See note 18 supra for the definition of "adjudication."
101. See note 20 supra for the definition of "agency."
102. See note 114 infra.
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consuming. But nothing short of such a careful examination will
provide the information that is the sine qua non of enlightened action
in the field of administrative procedure reform.' If the appropriate
officials of the Commonwealth should decide that budgetary considera-
tions preclude such a study, or if it is concluded that piecemeal reform
should proceed contemporaneously with the overall investigation, the
activities of each agency should be carefully catalogued for the purpose
of deciding which particular activities should be governed by the
Agency Law. This is needed because the Agency Law imposes a
general requirement of hearing for all non-exempted adjudications in
accordance with the procedures set forth in Sections 31-34 of the Law.
The adjudication provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act and the Model Act, on the other hand, are applicable only to those
adjudications, in the case of the Federal Act, which are "required by
[another] statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing",'0 4 and in the case of the Model Act, which are re-
quired "by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency
hearing." 105 As broad and general as those requirements are, they
are much more precise and selective than the provisions of the Penn-
sylvania statute. Accordingly, I would urge the Commission to recom-
mend amendment of the Law so as to enumerate with precision the
agency activities to be governed by its provisions.
(6) Establishment of a Division of Administrative Procedure
Experts have an important role in contemporary government, not
only in the realm of fact-finding but in the field of policy as well.
Experts, however, do not and should not have an unlimited final say.
Our governmental system has given the regular judiciary a powerful
role in curbing the excesses of expertise and in making basic policy
choices. But the functions to be performed by judicial review are
limited. Factors such as the great volume of administrative adjudica-
tion, the cost of court litigation, the necessity for quick action, and
the vast area of administrative action which is not subject to judicial
review drastically restrict the effectiveness of court review of adminis-
trative action.'06
103. It is possible that the study undertaken by the Joint State Government Com-
mission in 1941-42, see p. 23 supra, produced much of the needed data. Judged, how-
ever, in terms of the report resulting from the study, note 12 supra, it is extremely
doubtful that the study was sufficiently comprehensive or intensive to provide the de-
sired information. The report consisted of 23 pages of which 15 were devoted to the
text of proposed legislation; with which compare the 369-page main report and 1400
odd pages of supplementary reports of the Benjamin study.
104. See § 5 of the Federal Act.
105. See § 1(3) of the Model Act.
106. "Candor compels me to admit, however, that the remedy of judicial review,
in most cases, has no practical content. Business transactions cannot wait upon the
exigencies of appeal." Remarks of Chester T. Lane, then-General Counsel Securi-
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Similarly, the safeguard to private interests to be found in the
opportunity for a formal administrative hearing is often illusory. To
take an example from the federal field: During the first twelve years
of the Securities and Exchange Commission's administration of the
Securities Act of 1933, 6,572 registration statements were filed.1 7
Of this number 5,341 became effective and 913 were withdrawn; in
only 182 cases were stop orders issued after formal administrative
proceedings.' Of the 182 stop order cases, there were only three
instances in which the registrant sought judicial review; 109 and in no
case was the Commission's order reversed. The fact of the matter,
of course, is that issuers and underwriters of securities are not in-
terested in administrative or court litigation. Their objective and the
objective of their counsel is to "clear" the registration statement with
the staff of the Corporation Finance Division of the Commission and
to secure the Division's blessing to "acceleration" of the effective date
of the statement. Accordingly, if, after the registration statement has
been filed, the staff suggests to the registrant that the statement con-
tains "deficiencies", the procedure is either to convince the staff (in
rare instances, the Commission itself) that the statement is not deficient
or to file an amendment to the registration statement correcting the
alleged deficiency. To resist the staff to the bitter end and to rely
upon one's ability to prove in the formal stop order proceedings that
the statement actually contains no deficiencies would be folly. In the
words of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure, " . . . even where formal proceedings are fully available, in-
formal procedures constitute the vast bulk of administrative adjudica-
tion and are truly the lifeblood of the administrative process. No study
of administrative procedure can be adequate if it fails to recognize this
fact and focus attention upon improvement at these stages." 110
Therefore, while not minimizing the importance of reform in the
fields of judicial review and formal administrative procedure, it appears
to me imperative that attention also be directed to the informal adminis-
trative process. Because administrative procedure reformers as well
as other students of the administrative process have largely overlooked
this important segment of the administrative process, there is relatively
ties and Exchange Commission, in Symposium on Administrative Law, 9 Am. L.
ScHooL REv. 162 (1939). See also REP. ArT'y. GEN. CommI. AD. PRoc. 76-77 (1941);
BENJAMIN REPORT 15-16.
107. 12 SEC ANNT. REP. 6 (1947).
108. Ibid.
109. Austin Silver Mining Company et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion et al., 1 SEC JUD. DEC. 732 (C. A. D. C. 1939) ; Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. Secu-
rifles and Exchange Commission, 100 F. 2d 999 (C. C. A. 10th 1939); Unity Gold
Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission (C. C. A. 9th 1939 (unreported)).
Cf. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1 (1936).
110. REp. ATT',. GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 35 (1941).
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little information and observation on the subject."" Detailed informa-
tion on the informal procedures of the various Commonwealth agencies
almost certainly is not readily available. It is thus apparent that re-
form at this level could not practicably be considered by the Joint State
Government Commission in its current study. Furthermore, it is
almost certain that as a practical matter, informal procedures could not
effectively be imposed or controlled by legislation. It seems to me,
therefore, that in order fruitfully to study and improve the informal
administrative procedures, the Commonwealth should, as California
did in 1945,"' establish a Division of Administrative Procedure to
devote constant attention to improvement of the administrative process
in the Commonwealth.
Although improvement of informal administrative procedures
would be a prime objective of the Division, other equally important
functions should also be assigned to it. These would include: ...
1. Studying the formal (as well as informal) administrative
procedures and judicial review of administrative action of the
agencies of the Commonwealth with a view to recommending
general and specific improvements.' 1
2. Transmitting such "information and making such recom-
mendations to the agencies as might facilitate the uniform adop-
tion, wherever practicable and desirable, of procedures which
have proved most satisfactory.
3. Assisting the agencies, upon their request, with regard to
procedural problems, including, for example, the drafting of pro-
cedural rules.""'
111. The subject is discussed in REP. ATTrY. GEN. Comm. AD. PROC. C. III (1941);
GELLnORN, op. cit. supra note 50, c. II; CHAMBERLAIN, DOWLING AND HAYS, THE
JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADmIxIsTRATvF AGENCIES 9-14 (1942) ; Blair-Smith,
Forms of Administrative Interpretation under the Securities Laws, 26 IowA L. Rv.
241 (1941).
112. Cal. Laws 1945, c. 869. See also JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, TENTH
BIENNIAL REPORT 10-12 (1944), proposing establishment of a Department of Admin-
inistrative Procedure.
113. Both Mr. Benjamin and the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure recommended the establishment of a division or office of administrative pro-
cedure, and the list of functions suggested in the text is based largely upon their recom-
mendations. BENJAMIN REPORT 18-21; REP. AT'fy. GEN. Comm. AD. PROC. 123-124,
193-194 (1941).
114. It is possible that the proposed Division should make the initial comprehen-
sive study recoinmended, supra p. 44. Offhand, however, I am inclined to think that
more would be gained from an investigation undertaken by a special group or indi-
vidual.
115. It should be noted specifically that the Division would have no power to im-
pose its views or recommendations upon the agencies. To give the Division authority,
for example, to prescribe procedural rules for the agencies would, in my judgment re-
sult in an undesirable division of responsibility between the agencies and the Division.
Mr. Benjamin expresses a similar opinion, BENJAMIN REPORT 19. But see SEN. BILL
No. 530, Pa. Gen. Ass., 1945 Sess., authorizing the Department of Justice to prescribe
rules of practice for Pennsylvania administrative agencies; needless to say, in my
opinion, proposals such as contained in SEN. BILL No. 530 should not be approved
by the Joint State Government Commission.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
4. Receiving and investigating criticisms and suggestions
made by the public regarding the procedure of particular agencies,
and reporting thereon to the complainant and agency involved.
5. Administering the Pennsylvania Register or other publica-
tion medium.
6. Making annual or more frequent reports to the Governor
and the General Assembly concerning the work of the Division,
the reports to include such recommendations for legislation or
otherwise as the Division deems appropriate.
An adequately staffed Division charged with these responsibilities
should be able to effect fruitful reform in both formal and informal
procedures of Commonwealth agencies." 6 Both Mr. Benjamin and
the Attorney General's Committee found that the agencies welcomed
suggestions for improvement. Mr. Benjamin further emphasized the
importance of providing an independent organ to which private parties
could bring their complaints and suggestions. And the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee was impressed "by the possibilities for greater uni-
formity in many subordinate particulars . . [and] by the absence
in many agencies of information or interest concerning the procedures
in other parts of the Federal administrative establishment." 117 These
observations, which in the main would also be applicable to Pennsyl-
vania, forcefully suggest the desirability of establishing an organization
to study and improve administrative procedures in the Commonwealth.
To paraphrase the statement made by John Foster Dulles in com-
menting on a similar proposal made by the Attorney General's Com-
mittee: This is the most important and most constructive proposal
which the Joint State Government Commission might consider. The
task of administrative procedure reform is so vast that even after years
of effort by the bar of the Commonwealth much still remains to be
explored. Further, the administrative process is in constant flux.
When new commissions are established or when old commissions meet
new situations or assume new tasks, their procedures are different-
and should be different-from those appropriate to the regulation of a
field which has been well explored. Initially these must be tentative,
exploratory decisions in particular cases. Later the principles of these
decisions, when tested and to the extent proved valid, may be embodied
in semi-permanent rules of general applicability. Many of the differ-
ences between the proponents of flexibility and diversity and the ad-
116. Mr. Benjamin estimated that a Director and two assistants, along with a
modest stenographical and clerical force, would have been sufficient for the proposed
New York Division of Administrative Procedure. BENjAmIN REPORT 21.
117. REP. Arr'Y. GEx. Comm. AD. PRoc. 123 (1941).
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vocates of greater uniformity are not so much difference in principle
as difference in regard to the proper timing of a standarization which
would agree to be ultimately salutary and practical. It is thus of vital
importance that the field should be under constant survey and study.
Quite apart from substantive legislation which may result therefrom,
the continuing existence of an investigatory body will, itself, serve to
stimulate administrative agencies to self-effort toward the detection
and elimination of faulty procedures and incompetent personnel. The
existence of an outside agency authorized to receive complaints will
do much to reassure a public which is restive because it feels that it at
present can bring its grievances only to the very party by which it
feels aggrieved. The Division of Administrative Procedure can serve
so greatly to improve the working of the administrative process that
its creation would reduce to secondary importance the other legislative
proposals to be considered by the Joint State Government Com-
mission.""
III. CONCLTSION
Doubtless, other reform proposals will come before the Joint State
Government Commission."' Still other topics which have been the
subject of legislation in other states and the federal government prob-
ably will not be considered by the Commission in its present delibera-
tions.12° Considerations of space preclude discussion of such matters
here. But what has gone before discloses my conception of the manner
in which administrative procedure reform should proceed: generaliza-
tions and abstract principles are suspect; allegations of deficiencies and
evils are to be thoroughly investigated; if investigation discloses weak-
nesses, specific measures carefully tailored to correct particular defects
are to be proposed; affected agencies and private interests are to be
given an opportunity to appraise the proposed remedy before it is
thrust upon them. The method of patiently pursuing facts and pre-
paring remedial measures in light of the specific evil disclosed is costly,
slow and unspectacular. Yet it is clear to me that only through such
rational processes will meaningful and lasting reforms be achieved.
118. Dulles, The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure, 41
COL. L. Rav. 617, 618-619 (1941). See also Dickinson, The Acheson Report: A Novel
Approach to Administrative Law, 90 U. op PA. L. Rav. 757, 779 (1942) : "The Com-
mittee's recommendation that a permanent organization to be known as the 'Office of
Administrative Procedure' shall be set up to carry on its work in this field is perhaps
the most fruitful item in its report."
119. E. g., the proposal of the Section on Administrative Law that appeals from
the Court of Common Pleas should be taken to the Superior Court instead of "to the
Superior or Supreme Court as in other cases." Report of Section on Administrative
Law, 19 PA. B. A. REP. 386, 387 (1948).
120. See the various provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, of
the Model Act, and the recent enactments discussed in Nathanson, supra note 26.
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The basic and therefore recurring problem of administrative law
is how to secure effective governmental regulation within the frame-
work of a democratic, constitutional political system. Or, in the
felicitous prose of Justice Frankfurter, "How to fit ancient liberties,
which have gained a new preciousness, into solution of those exigent
and intricate economic problems that have been too long avoided
rather than faced, is the special task of Administrative Law." 121 As
we are often reminded, there is a danger that we shall lose our liberties
to the bureaucrats. There is also a danger-to which our attention is
not so often invited-that an indiscriminate imposition on the ad-
ministrative of procedures originally designed to govern the business
of courts, or an undue extension of judicial control over administrative
action, may make the administrative an impotent instrument for social
control. And if it should occur that government finds itself unable to
cope effectively with the problems of an industrialized society, the
threat to our liberties will be far graver than any to be attributed to
bureaucracy. I do not wish to be understood as "viewing with alarm."
I desire simply to emphasize that in considering the problem of state
administrative procedure reform in a federal political system and an
industrialized economy, due consideration must be given to the de-
sirability of maintaining an effective regulatory process.
121. Frankfurter, Foreword, 41 CoL. L. RFv. 584, 586 (1941).
